Last week in Lesotho, opposition leaders Tom Thabane and Thesele ‘Maseribane fled to Botswana and South Africa, again seeking protection from SADC against what they said were assassination attempts by the Lesotho Defense Force. As Lesotho under Prime Minister Mosisili continues its pattern of political crisis, it begs the question just where political violence is rooted in a country often described as “homogenous.” 

First, it should be noted, that despite all the high-political machinations and high-profile assassinations over the past 9 months, everyday life in Lesotho has not been greatly affected. These are the squabbles of the political elite. Where everyday Basotho are affected is in the absence: The absence of strong government policy on HIV/AIDS; The absence of fresh proposals to bolster popular programs like the old-age pension scheme; The absence of a plan to get security forces to stop shooting at each other.

Why are politicians and top security leaders seemingly always at each other’s throats? Surely it has to do with the poverty of the country and the outsized influence that comes with controlling appointments to the civil service — one of the largest employers in the country.

On another level, however, perhaps it is better to look to South Africa and the machinations of the ANC as a model for what is happening in Lesotho. Periodically over the last decade or more, the ANC has gone through a round of internal purges, often somewhat opaque to outsiders, but certainly a distraction from governing. The ever-present splintering of political parties in Lesotho and the internal machinations in the Lesotho Defense Force resemble nothing so much as the inner circle of the ANC: A small ruling elite maneuvering for control of the levers of power seemingly not answerable to the populace. 

The 1980s and 1990s were the period during which most of Lesotho’s current leaders cut their chops. The military commanders were coming up through the ranks in an institution that had close ties both to the ANC-in-exile in Maseru and the South African security forces. Similarly, the current politicians came of age in a fractured and factional BCP that had to operate partially underground, partially in exile, and partially in collaboration with the non-elected BNP and military-run governments.

Lesotho in the 1980s was not a place where respect for the rule of law came first. The lessons learned by today’s leaders in that generative moment seem to be still fueling an environment where soldiers threaten judges on the bench, and where no charges are ever filed in conjunction with public violence on the eve of national elections.

In recent days, civil society in Lesotho has been more outspoken about the climate of violence and impunity, but threats remain, especially to journalists. Will aid cuts or diplomatic pressure bring a solution?

While these sorts of gestures are better than nothing, what Lesotho needs is fundamental political reform, a respect for the rule of law, and, perhaps, a fundamental rethink of the forms of democracy in the Mountain Kingdom so that not only can Basotho “Kena ka Khotso” (Come in Peace), as the border gates say, but “Lula ka khotso” (Stay in Peace). 

Prior to last week's elections, multi-party democracy only existed in the period 2012-14 and the immediate post-independence period, 1966-70. Otherwise, Lesotho had single party rule, military rule, or token Parliamentary opposition. All periods have featured stark political polarization and vehement rhetoric, but there has been a softening over time of the view of 1966-70. The late Motsapi Moorosi, Lesotho’s first Olympian, noted that while at the time he thought them incompetent, the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) “battled,” and “to my surprise they did well” in building “infrastructure and everything.” Key here is not only the historical revisionism, but the emphasis on development outcomes in determining competency.

Basotho voters in 2015 passed similar judgment on leaders of the contemporary period in evaluating conflicting claims in the wake of the August skirmish between army and police that caused Thabane to flee the country briefly. He claimed this was an attempted coup brought about because of his anti-corruption drive, which he deemed a serious effort to root out officials skimming off the top of contracts, and awarding tenders to friends and relatives. Conversely, his former coalition partner, Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing, called the anti-corruption drive, which he has failed to quash, a political witch-hunt hiding behind a veil of donor-friendly terms like "anti-corruption" and "good governance."

The collapse of the Thabane-Metsing coalition and the resulting 2015 elections were, thus, yet another salvo in the rhetorical ‘development wars’ between politicians in Lesotho, ongoing since independence. The sad reality is that most Basotho have benefitted little from this rhetoric, with Lesotho ranking at the bottom of tables on global mortality and health.

So what is different about 2015? First, while Thabane lost the office of Prime Minister, his ABC party increased its constituencies won from 26 to 40, becoming a national party on the strength of its anti-corruption platform. Second, the return of ex-Prime Minister Mosisili to office matters because he did so by going into opposition and waiting for the next election to restate his case to voters. Third, voters explicitly rejected Metsing, gutting his party’s electoral support and deeming him primarily responsible for the political turmoil. Fourth, Lesotho recently qualified for a second round of US Millennium Challenge Corporation development funding and started construction on Phase II of the Highlands Water Project. The DC-led coalition needs to retain democratic legitimacy to continue these vital projects.

The key, however, was that voters in Lesotho punished perceived incompetency, and rewarded moves against political corruption, constructive opposition, and calls for community-based development. Political scientists have demonstrated that as competition among parties rises, so do development outcomes. The emergence of two main parties—the governing DC and opposition ABC—could portend more focus on development deliverables to local communities. The DC-led coalition is precarious, with seven parties needed to cobble together 65 of 120 Parliamentary seats. With such a tenuous majority, they will have to govern with an eye toward the next election. The ABC, meanwhile, increased its voting share in every district on the back of perceived competency in government and will be looking to continue its upward trajectory in the 2020 polls by offering constructive opposition. Thus, for one of the first times in its history, delivery of development to ordinary people could lead to electoral victory. Is this the maturation of politics in Lesotho? Only time will tell, but the 2015 polls suggest that despite fractious appearances Lesotho offers an example of positive trends in African governance, as well as hope for ordinary Basotho.