(1) Identity politics is neoliberalism, as Adolph Reed once said. And it delivers like clockwork. The hip hop producer Sean Diddy Combs (he produced Biggie Smalls) opened a for profit charter school in Harlem where he was born. Because--as he said--he would rather do "something about" education than just complain about it. (And he chose to "do it" with a for-profit school that has "Capital" in its name. BTW, Diddy isn't the only celebrity that's in on the charter school movement. Even people like John Legend. Once you stopped chuckling, this sort of thing is further along in African countries (and elsewhere) than you think. In Liberia (they convinced the government; rapper Akon is kneedeep in this project), Uganda (where they've had some pushback), Kenya, and on a smaller scale in South Africa (the Spark Schools; most of the funding is private, but these initiatives are getting open support from the Democratic Alliance governed Western Cape province). Behind it are groups like Teach for All. The African outpost of the charter school movement get a lot of soft pedal coverage in publications like (obviously) The Economist. For a broad overview, we'd suggest revisiting Maria Hengeveld's interview with activists. (3)  Staying with identity politics in #othercountries: "Hillary is Queen, Bae, Beyoncé—you get it. Chelsea is the prodigy—2.0, if you will." I can't anymore. (4) In South Africa, a Nigerian migrant is suing the South African immigrant authorities and the police (South Africans, on balance, are notoriously xenophobic to other Africans). He was shot in the leg after they accused him of having weed on him. He was only charged 18 months later. The victim, Justin Ejimkonye, claimed he was shot because he did not want to pay a bribe. It is well past time someone did, but as Alison Tilley, a rights activist reminded me, this is not the first time someone sued the South Africans. (5) By now everyone knows about Helen Zille's defense of colonialism. Whites in South Africans say racist things on social media on the daily. Zille matters because she is the Premier (the equivalent of a governor of a state) of the Western Cape, one of South Africa's nine provinces. You can read Vito Laterza's analysis of Zille's remarks, including how she is emblematic of a global trend by rightwingers to say feel emboldened to say aloud what they've been feeling all along.  Some of have come to Zille's defense, including the usual "explanation" and "on the other hand"-ery of liberals. The most prominent, though, was Ferial Haffajee, one of the first black editors of a major South African newspaper (and now at Huffington Post South Africa), who defended Zille's "right" to be racist and offensive. The best response to Haffajee has been UCT law professor Pierre De Vos's response. It is important as it challenges "liberals" and their free speech absolutism. It may come across as a bit lawyerly and long. That's necessary. Read it. (6) More consequential than Zille's odious tweets about colonialism, has been how she and her party governs the Western Cape and Cape Town. Last week, the provincial government nixed a plan to build affordable housing on the edge of the city center for mostly domestic workers and gardeners serving their mostly white employers and for people being displaced by gentrification. The Cape Town City Council, run by Zille's party (the mayor blocked me on Twitter; surprise) is no better. On Human Rights Day, March 21, it sent in "the Red Ants" (an infamous council unit) to demolish shacks rebuilt after a fire in a squatter settlement outside Hout Bay, that place recently described by Omar of the Wire (Michael K Williams when doubles as a reporter for VICE) as what happens when "Malibu and the Hamptons had a baby." All this--I am from Cape Town--made me wonder whether this could be impetus for new solidarities in Western Cape between Africans and coloured working classes/lumpens as counter to divide-and-rule of the Democratic Alliance and the rank incompetence of the ANC as opposition? Nothing wrong with dreaming. (7) Near Johannesburg, South Africa, a white man bullied, threatened and abused a black woman over the actions of their children in a playpen at a popular restaurant chain. By now, you're mumbling "next" as this sort of thing is widespread in South Africa. In any case, this all happened at the Spur, a South African restaurant chain pretending to draw on Native American motifs.  Not everyone was surprised it happened there, given what that restaurant chain represents. As Busisiwe Deyi pointed out on this site in 2015: "Nothing about SPUR is Native North American except for its use of a Native American chief-like figure on its logo and Native American-esque names and themes. In truth, rather than Native American experience or culture, the imagery used by SPUR is that of the frontier US West and Southwest." It is worth rereading that post. (8) This (in the London Review of Books) by Adam Shatz on the "debate" around  Dana Schultz's painting "Open Casket" painting. On whether acts of "radical sympathy, and imaginative identification, are possible across racial lines." Also see Kara Walker's statement on Instagram. But it seems like we've been here before. Finally, it is worth remembering what Walter Benn Michaels argued a while back: "the point of the critique of capitalism is to get rid of poor people, not to make sure that they’re properly represented among the elite." (9) More #othercountries. This is an excellent take on the recent history of trade unions in the United States through the transformation of the Service Employees Industrial Union. I'd love to see an analysis like this on say unions in South Africa, Nigeria or Egypt. (10) Yes, this happened: "An annual African trade summit in California [in the United States; President: Donald Trump] had no African attendees this year after at least 60 people were denied visas." (11) VICE went and investigated extrajudicial killing in Kenya that are part and parcel of wildlife conservation. It is particularly good on knocking off Richard Leakey's halo (from how he is perceived/covered by elites/media in the west). Worth a read. (12) Then there are these clips of Paul Robeson and Eslanda Robeson from the film "Borderline" (1930), filmed in Switzerland. Just going to leave this here. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgCZ7572OpU

(12) Finally, since I am a shameless self-promoter: Go and get this new book about boycott politics that I contributed to.

We're bringing back Weekend Special. Borrowing its title from a song by the late Brenda Fassie, this is basically a list of 10 (ten) things we couldn't publish; only shared on our social media (which we know some of you are not on); or that we rant about but did not have the time to write about properly. This is the revival. This edition just made the cut late Sunday night to qualify. In future, watch out for it on Sunday mornings. (1) First a rant. If you're an African war criminal you get dragged to the International Criminal Court or one of its tribunals. If you're a U.S. war criminal you get to "paint people whose bodies were broken by the illegal wars you started" (as anthropologist Maggie Dickinson pointed out on Twitter). People Magazine will publish an approving profile and soft focus images of you while Facebook statuses will gush over how cuddly you are now. And if you are a British war criminal, you get to consult Africans about "good governance" while you overcharge them for doing nothing that can be classed as any advice and get away with it every time. Oh, and you keep pushing your services as a peace envoy in the Middle East, when we know which side you're on. (2) The work of Cameroonian photographer Steve Mvondo. (3) Contributor and one of my former students Yael Even Or writes in The Tablet about whether an Israeli company rigged Zimbabwe's 2013 elections for Life President Robert Mugabe. (4) This mix by Sonny Abegaze. (5) We can't make up minds about CyHi The Prynce's "Nu Africa" with its lyrics about "... What if Jay and Bey went and bought some land in Egypt? / And Puffy put a stripper club off the sands of Kenya?" It also sounds and look like the street companion to the backpack favorite "Promise Land" by Nas and Damian Marley. (6) Former South African President Thabo Mbeki was quoted on the Mail & Guardian website as saying South Africans "attacking foreign nationals is not patriotic or revolutionary." Here's the problem: Attacks on other Africans in South Africa were just as common during his administration (in fact, the first major postapartheid xenophobic attacks happened when he became President) and he did very little about it. During one of the attacks he flew to Japan, took days to even respond, denied it was even xenophobia when it so clearly was and failed to comfort the victims.) More importantly, a simple Google search will show that under his 2 administrations the number of deportations went up considerably (some stats indicate deportations of mostly other Africans from South Africa nearly doubled during his tenure), making a mockery of his empty platitudes--especially his 'stature' as a Pan-Africanist of sorts now. (7) On the xenophobic violence in South Africa, we can recommend some reading from our archive--Sisonke Msimang, Achille Mbembe and Suren Pillay--and this by Dan Magaziner and I as well as something much older I wrote in 2008. (8) This interview featuring Jacobin Magazine editor Bhaskar Sunkara (they're our partners) on the crises in American politics and the opportunities it present for Left politics: (9)  We will say more on this in due course, but just to state here: South African political culture is at a low point; in the latest episodes some students (offshoots of the Rhodes Must Fall movement) demanded the visiting Ngugi wa Thiong'o "throw white people out" out of a lecture he delivered at the University of Cape Town. Another is the phenomenon of "paid twitter" that runs cover for ruling party politicians who fail to deliver to ordinary, mostly poor,  black South Africans. The latest is the social development minister, Bathabile Dlamini, whose ministry may fail to process welfare payments for about 17 million people whose only income are these monthly grants. (10) Finally, we want to see all the films of French-Senegalese filmmaker, Alice Diop. As Youtube user Kaïraba Cissé concludes (and we're paraphrase-translating) in the comments for this video, from November 2016, below: Alice Diop has talent. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnmVK_YRRvU  

The political theorist Achille Mbembe, from the University of the Witswatersrand in Johannesburg, describes South Africa as experiencing a “negative moment.” Though protest and dissatisfaction with the terms of the “new” South Africa have been brewing for some time, there is a strong sense that the black majority is losing patience with the ruling African National Congress. The student protests, which engulfed campuses for much of 2015, while limited by its narrow base and focus, gave a glimpse of what it could look like if the black majority turned on the ANC. South Africa’s democratic system is twenty-two years old. The ruling African National Congress (ANC), once a liberation movement, has been transformed into an ordinary political party encumbered by an election cycle mentality, and the largesse of the state. The party also presents a paradox: Dissatisfaction with it and government are at all time highs. Much of the rancor is reserved for the country’s president, Jacob Zuma (2009-), whose regime is associated with the widespread corruption of state institutions and party structures. Yet, the ANC continues to command electoral majorities nationally, and holds executive power in eight of the nine provinces. The exception is the Western Cape, governed by an opposition party, the Democratic Alliance. The ANC also controls all major metros, i.e. large cities, except for one (Cape Town, also run by the DA). Because of the relative weakness of opposition parties, the fragmentation of the opposition landscape more generally, and the ANC’s continued national dominance, the preferred forms of political opposition are street protests, including wildcat strikes, by workers. Protests and disruptions are not new in the “new” South Africa.  But after an initial honeymoon period (which concluded with the retirement of Nelson Mandela from elected office), protests become synonymous with democratic politics in South African politics. Between 1999 and 2003, those protests took the form of either service delivery protests or more well organized “social movements.” The former were very local, often spontaneous, mostly parochial, short-lived struggles over housing, electricity and housing evictions. The latter were more planned, media savvy, drew on the language of struggle, allied to the ANC, brought back the language of the antiapartheid struggle and asserted new constitutional rights. The movement for access to affordable AIDS drugs and treatment, led by the Treatment Action Campaign is the best example. The TAC produced what was South Africa first post-apartheid, progressive—and crucially multiracial and national—movement outside the ANC and the trade unions, and forced concessions from the state through the court system. By the mid to late 2000s, more sporadic, and very violent protests, characterized by retaliatory police violence became ubiquitous. Police violence against protesters were commonplace, so was the security services spying on activists. But throughout this period, the ANC retained its legitimacy as the guarantor of the post-apartheid settlement. By this I mean the series of political, social and economic deals in which the racial inequalities of Apartheid and wealth disparities largely remain intact and which benefits whites in general. South Africa remains the most unequal country in the world with high levels of unemployment, much of it structural, disproportionately concentrated within the black labor force.  At the same time, the ANC promised a better life to black South Africa. To some extent they’ve delivered on it: 45% of households now receive some form of social assistance, more children are enrolled in schools and the government has embarked on an ambitious affirmative action project, creating a black middle class numerically equal the size of the white population. Then came the fateful events in August 2012 at Marikana, a mine owned by a British multinational in which the country’s current deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, was a non executive board member. Police—under pressure from the mine company and the minister of police—murdered 34 striking mine workers in broad daylight.  The events shocked South Africa though it, crucially, didn’t result in mass protests. The government subsequently held a public commission which disappointingly did not hold anyone specific accountable, but its symbolism wasn’t lost on South Africans and South Africa watchers. As Dan Magaziner and I wrote on “The Atlantic” magazine’s website in 2012: Though public discourse in South Africa refuse to acknowledge this, Marikana also marked the end of South African exceptionalism. South Africa’s problems are no longer specific to the apartheid legacy, but about more global issues of poverty and inequality, labor rights, corporate responsibility and the behavior of multinational corporations. In subsequent national and provincial elections in 2014, the ANC retained its electoral majority, but the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), formed merely a few months earlier, gained about 6% of the national vote. Since then, the EFF has replaced the Democratic Alliance as the effective parliamentary opposition in the public’s mind.  They use a mix of carnival (they dress like Chavistas), mass protests (they succeeded in getting 50,000 people to march from downtown Johannesburg to the city’s financial quarter where banks and the stock exchange is located) to disrupting parliamentary politics (getting kicked out of the chamber, shouting for President Zuma “to pay back the money” and publicly mocking his association with a wealthy business family). The student protests are a reflection of this wider unease. South Africa has 23 public universities, which includes some technikons since upgraded to university status. Most students in higher education institutions are black—a result of the new government’s expansion of college access. While students at historically black universities (like Tshwane University of Technology or the University of the Western Cape) had been protesting over fees and outsourcing of service jobs on campuses, it would be protests over symbols at UCT and Rhodes that would kickstart the student movement. In March, at UCT, students protested the prominence of a statue of Cecil John Rhodes, a divisive colonial figure, while at Rhodes they objected to the name of the university.  Those protests morphed into demands for more diverse faculty and to “decolonize” curriculums. By midyear, the protests linked up with trade unions opposing outsourcing on campuses, and by year end they demanded, first, a freeze on fees increases, and simultaneously free, public higher education. In late October 2015, after students had marched to his office in the capital Pretoria, Zuma announced there would be no fee increase. The movement was distinctive for its use of social media, highlighting patriarchy and sexual abuse in black movement politics, openly questioning the hegemony of the ANC and the failure of the new South Africa to deal with racial and class inequality. Since the end of 2015, as the essayist TO Molefe (who is sympathetic to the students) has noted in “World Policy Journal,” the student movements have stalled somewhat: "Revolution as becoming isn’t only about what society and individuals should become; the protesters mostly appear to have that part down pat. They want freedom, for real this time, for themselves and those like them. But there is also this perhaps most important question at the center of this principle: How do you co-exist with those whose outsized power you’ve just overthrown?" Similarly, the insistence on horizontal forms of organization, may hamstrung the students: Everyone is a leader.  There is no national, coordinated structure, but a series of movements and allies that draw on student groups, the youth wings of mainstream political parties and SRC’s. As a result, groups like the EFF and the even smaller PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress), a black nationalist party that is relatively marginalized in both liberation and postapartheid politics, have made comebacks among students. Black racial solidarity is foregrounded in some cases (the movements at UCT and Wits University inhibit white student involvement), but obscures differences in the issues faced by students depending on where they are located in the class structure that is South Africa’s higher education system. The issues and conditions of a black student at UWC is very different from her counterpart at UCT. Similarly, the state has employed significantly more violence in its response to protests at historically black universities where there’s less media coverage and very little middle class outrage. Then there’s the terminology. The students prefer “decolonization” to “transformation,” the latter preferred by the state and university administrations. But even then, “decolonization” remains an elusive term. It is a big catchall, encompassing symbolic politics, white supremacy, curriculum, patriarchy, demands for diverse faculty, language politics, fees and free public higher education, among others. Currently, students on some of the elite campuses (most notably Wits, UCT and to some extent Rhodes) are embroiled in internecine battles over sexuality, gender and class. Finally, and this is a crucial point, less we overstate the extent of this rebellion:  The students represent a minority. South Africa’s labor force is characterized by low numbers of college graduates. There are only about one million students enrolled in the university sector out of a population of 54,9 million people. This raises the question of the linkages of these student movements to the larger unease in the society or to link up with causes and groups beyond campuses. Nevertheless, the student protests coupled with the growing appeal of the EFF and the restructuring of the trade union movement (the largest union federation split) represent an interesting political moment for South Africa. Until now the most vocal opponents of the ANC government in the public sphere were middle class whites.  What the student protests have achieved is perhaps point to a possible break in the ANC’s middle class black support (who up until now was solidly for the ruling party) and that, more than street protests in faraway townships, they represent a greater threat to the ANC’s hegemony and, more crucially, the party political system. * This essay was first published in the latest issue of the Africa Workshop Newsletter of the American Political Science Association. The issue focused on the politics of higher education in Africa.

Recently, Aubrey Bloomfield, a graduate student at The New School, and I wrote a piece for The Nation about a sports boycott as a strategy against the occupation of Palestinian land by Israel. Here's an excerpt:

There appears to be support among Palestinians generally for sporting sanctions against Israel. However, to date BDS has largely been focused on other targets. In recent years, the cultural boycott has become a growing aspect of the movement. While the success or failure of cultural boycotts is debatable (they have had success up to a point), what the South African case points to perhaps is the greater impact of sports boycotts on political attitudes and reform. One thing that seems to work well—when international diplomacy and common sense have failed—is the threat of withdrawing a rogue nation from the community of sport. In South Africa the slogan “no normal sport in an abnormal society” encapsulated the conviction that as long as the regime excluded the majority of its people from participating in society as equals, it should be excluded from participating in international sports competitions as equals. For white South Africans (and their apologists), sporting isolation was a bitter pill to swallow. The Israeli government and sports associations’ responses to recent threats of Israeli expulsion from UEFA and FIFA are particularly instructive: Citizens have strong feelings about sport. It is closely tied to national identity, and the symbolic effects of sporting sanctions are more palpable than economic sanctions may be for many citizens (in the way, say, that being denied access to certain commodities may not be). Up to now, BDS has been largely ambivalent about a sports boycott. Nevertheless, experience has shown that sports boycotts are very powerful tools for international solidarity groups. Ultimately, they could prove crucial in the Palestinian case, forcing a much broader conversation about the Israeli occupation and potentially representing one of the most significant threats yet to the status quo.

Boima is on vacation this week, so the rest of us scanned the music pages. We can't promise it will be as eclectic as Boima's choices. But here we go in short sentences. First up, the Kenyan-Australian singer Okenyo has a new video for her song "Just a Story." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UhayQ4tIbQw Fashawn, who sounds like Kanye West, loves his daughter: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hm9YeQw1oW0 De La Soul is working on a new album. While prepping, they just come up with new music, with special guest Nas. It just happens to them like that: This is just a video of Youssoupha (son of Tabu Ley Rochereau) promoting his big concert in November in Paris: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfcVL2VeAUo Then there's South African rapper Khuli Chana's "Mahamba Yedwa/Mo Tsipe": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bzjGr5TCio Then there's Kenyan singer Fena Gitu and her upbeat lyrics about her "African Jack Bauer" (no politics here): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WesFY9eeLJc Finally, The Kyle Shepherd Trio wants to fly without leaving the ground. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xIsoVLwYDe4 * Goodbye to John Shoes Moshoeu, Peter Makurube, Christopher Kindo and our friend Cristina Villeresi. We will always remember you.